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Abstract  
 
 
The effect of aid on civil war has been widely debated. In this paper we introduce a new framework 
to evaluate the effectiveness of aid on conflict. Using proxies for the evolution of conflict we show 
that over the course of the conflict aid significantly affects the escalation and de-escalation of 
conflicts and that both measures are also highly sensitive to the rate of change in the share of aid. 
These results provide useful indications from a policy point of view in terms of the timing of aid to 
countries experiencing a conflict. We also show that the evolution of conflict significantly affects 
economic growth providing evidence of a sort of indirect effect of aid on economic growth. 
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1) Introduction 
 
Countries experiencing conflicts are among the largest recipients of foreign aid benefiting by an 
average share of ODA equal to almost 6 percent of GDP, compared with an average 5.6 percent for 
countries at peace. The share of ODA is particularly high for countries experiencing an extensive 
conflict (almost 12 percent of GDP) and for countries in which several groups are involved in the 
conflict (above 7 percent). The rate of growth of the share of ODA/GDP for these countries is also 
much larger, with an average growth equal to 0.2 percent compared to a mere 0.07 percent for 
countries at peace. It is not surprising therefore to wonder whether foreign aid has any effect on 
breaking the spell of conflict. And if aid is effective, how does it affect the evolution of the conflict? 
 
The economic literature, from both the empirical and theoretical points of view, has for long tried to 
provide an answer to these questions often with puzzling results. At times aid is found to have a 
positive effect on conflict, sometimes the effect is negative and at other times it has no effect at all 
(see Easterly, 2009 for a survey on aid). This pattern of results depends on the fact that it is still 
difficult to understand the main channel(s) through which aid may affect the conflict. If we consider 
aid as a potential prize then it is possible that aid may affect opportunities shrinking the Potential 
Settlement Region (Hirshleifer, 1995, 2001) and therefore increasing the probability of conflict. Aid 
may represent a rent influencing the incentive for rebel groups to engage in a conflict as well as the 
incentive for the government to defend its rent (Grossman 1991, 1992, 1999). Aid may also spur 
economic growth (i.e., Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002; Hansen and Tarp, 
2001), creating opportunities in terms of employment, structural and distributional policies which 
then can have an effect on the cost opportunity of citizens to enrol in rebel groups. The higher 
opportunity cost makes conflict a less attractive option (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). In addition, 
because aid is fungible (Feyzioglu et al., 1998; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004; Pack and Pack, 
1990; Devarajan, 1999)  it may be diverted to military expenditure providing the government with a 
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clear military advantage, which in turn affects the opportunity for rebel groups to engage in conflict 
(Arcand and Chauvet, 2001).  
 
From an empirical point of view the evidence is also not very convincing. De Ree and Nielsen 
(2010) look at a direct effect of aid on the probability of conflict using a 2SLS for a sample of 39 
African countries over a 19-year period and they find a significant and direct effect of aid on the 
probability of conflict. A 10 percentage change in the share of aid reduces the probability by 6-8 
percent per year.  Savun and Tirone (2011) find that “democracy aid” considerably reduces the risk 
of conflict by affecting the commitment problem and uncertainty resulting from a democratic 
transition. Candland et al. (2011) look at aid shocks and find a positive effect of negative aid shocks 
on the risk of conflict. On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler (2007), Djankov et al. (2008) and 
Nunn and Qian (2011) seem to be less optimistic. Collier and Hoeffler (2007) find that aid increases 
military expenditure but the latter has no effect on the probability of conflict. Djankov et al. (2008) 
show a negative effect of foreign aid on institutions which then may increase the probability of 
conflict (Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2007). Nunn and Qian (2011) focus on the U.S. food aid 
programme and show that a change in the amount of aid increases the incidence, onset and duration 
of civil conflicts in recipient countries.  
 
The main problem with evaluating the effect of aid on conflict derives from the fact that it is 
difficult to isolate the effect of aid in a regression where the latter changes with other important 
policy variables. As a result the effectiveness of aid may depend on the specification of the model 
and omitted variables bias. It may be more appropriate therefore to look at the effect of aid on 
conflict in a context where the national government has no room for manoeuvring while aid keeps 
changing (because its allocation is decided by foreign countries). The evolution of the conflict may 
therefore represent the ideal set-up given that the weakness of the government over the course of the 
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conflict provides a sort of political stalemate limiting its policy action (i.e. Fearon and Laitin, 2003) 
which then may result in a kind of dependence on foreign aid.  
 
There are also other practical reasons why it may be worth focusing on the evolution rather than on 
the incidence, onset or duration of conflict. Most often, besides the importance of evaluating the 
effect of aid on the outbreak and incidence of civil war, we also want to know the implications of 
changing the share of foreign aid over the course of conflict. This can only be done by looking at 
the dynamics/evolution of the conflict, given that, unlike the incidence, the evolution allows us to 
evaluate whether the conflict either escalates or de-escalates when donors increase the amount of 
aid. Because the evolution is  conditional on the probability of conflict, this also reduces biases 
which are due to the endogeneity of the onset and incidence (see Blatman and Miguel, 2010) and to 
the use of small samples typical of duration models (see Bleaney and Dimico, 2011). Considering 
the evolution also offers more insights than considering the duration, given that it is possible to 
distinguish between the escalation and the de-escalation of conflict providing useful insights from a 
policy point of view. It also may be considered as a primitive of the duration, given that the latter 
will depend on whether the conflict either intensifies or dies down
1
. 
 
There are several possible candidates that one can use in order to proxy the evolution. The extent of 
conflict, the number of groups in conflict with the government, and the number of fatalities are all 
possible and viable options. However, while the geographical extent and the number of groups in 
conflict have both important strategic implications, the same does not apply particularly well to the 
evolution of fatalities, which of course has important humanitarian consequences. Focusing on these 
two proxies we find that the level of foreign aid significantly deters conflicts from escalating (both 
in terms of the number of groups and in terms of geographical extent). The rate of change of ODA 
                                                 
1
  Cunningham (2006) and Cunningham et al. (2009)  show that the duration of conflict largely depends on the number 
of groups in the conflict. 
 
5 
over the course of the conflict also seems to matter for the evolution of the conflict given that a 
larger change in the share of ODA is associated both with a lower probability of new groups 
entering in the conflict and a higher probability that the conflict de-escalates from a territorial point 
of view. These effects are extremely significant from an economic point of view, given that the 
entry of new groups in the conflict decreases the rate of growth of GDP per capita by almost 4 
percent, while the exit of any contesting group increases the rate of growth by almost 3 percent.  
 
Besides the economic importance of the evolution/dynamics of conflict there are other important 
policy implications which should be discussed. First, increasing the share of aid over the course of 
the conflict seems to be particularly useful in ethnic fractionalized countries where the entry of new 
groups seems to be more likely. Given that aid increases the probability of contesting rebel groups 
exiting from the conflict, then a change in the share of aid in ethnic fractionalized countries may 
effectively shorten the duration of conflict. Second, given the preventive effect of aid, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the earlier donors increase the share of aid the lower will be the 
probability of the conflict escalating, thus shortening the duration and containing its negative effect 
on development.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next Section we provide a short review of the literature on 
foreign aid. In Section 3 we describe dependent variables, describing the approach that we follow in 
order to code our variables for the evolution of conflict. Section 4 presents the empirical results for 
the effect of levels of ODA on the evolution. In Section 5, we focus on the effect of the rate of 
change in the share of ODA/GDP and in Section 6 we show the economic impact of the evolution 
of conflict, using a simple growth model. The paper ends with short conclusions and policy 
implications. 
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2) Literature Review 
 
The paper builds on two closely related areas of research. The first area is related to the 
effectiveness of foreign aid on economic growth and institutions, while the second research area 
focuses on foreign aid and conflict. 
 
Regarding the effectiveness of aid on economic growth, this is a topic which has been largely 
discussed in economics often without conclusive evidence either way. Although early research 
seems to show that foreign aid has a positive effect on economic growth, this result does not seem 
to be robust to further sensitivity analysis. Even among “aid-optimistics” results are not completely 
consistent. Hansen and Trap (2001) find a non-conditional effect of foreign aid on economic 
growth, even though the effect has diminishing returns; while Burnside and Dollar (2000) and 
Collier and Dollar (2002) find that foreign aid has a positive effect on economic growth but this 
effect is confined to a set of countries with good institutions and policies.  
 
Following these early findings the World Bank has tied foreign aid to a set of good policy 
indicators. However, later research has shown that this evidence is far from being robust. Easterly et 
al. (2004) and Easterly (2003) show that results in Burnside and Dollar (2000) are affected by 
sample-selection and definitions of aid and policies. Roodman (2004) tests the sensitivity of several 
pro-growth papers and finds that results in most of these papers are not robust to further controls. 
Prezworsky and Vreeland (2000) and Barro and Lee (2005) look at IMF credits and they also find 
no support for a pro-growth effect of these loans.  
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Evidence at support of the effect of foreign aid on institutions does not seem very encouraging 
either. Knack (2004) finds no effect of aid on democracy (the latter being measured by the Freedom 
House), Djankov et al. (2008) show a negative effect of foreign aid on institutional measures (i.e., 
checks and balances and democracy from the Polity IV) and Rajan and Subramanian (2007) argue 
in favour of a weakening effect of aid on governance.   
 
With regard to aid and conflict, apart from De Ree and Nielsen (2010), Savun and Tirone (2011), 
Cadland et al. (2011), Collier and Hoeffler (2007) and Nunn and Qian (2011) who evaluate the 
effect of foreign aid on incidence, onset, or duration, the literature has mainly focused on foreign 
aid in post-conflict countries and fragile states. Chauvet and Collier (2006) evaluate the effect of aid 
in failing states and find that in these countries aid has a positive effect on per capita income 
depending on the timing and appropriateness of aid. Chen et al. (2008), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), 
Elbadawi et al. (2008) and David et al. (2011) all find some evidence of post-conflict recovery in 
growth, although these results are sometimes based on only a limited sample of conflict episodes. 
The role of aid and other policies after the end of conflict has also been extensively discussed 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Demekas et al., 2002; Elbadawi et al., 2008; Flores and Nooruddin, 
2009).   
 
 
3) Data Construction and Summary Statistics 
 
To proxy the evolution/dynamics of conflict we decide to focus on the number of groups involved 
in the conflict and on the geographical extent of conflict. These two dimensions of the conflict seem 
to be extremely interesting from a strategic point of view given that the duration and intensity of 
conflicts are highly likely to depend on these features.  
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Although geographical extent and the number of groups are likely to be positively correlated, in our 
dataset the correlation is far from perfect. The correlation between the geographical extent and the 
number of groups in conflict is only 0.58 and the correlation between the evolution of these two 
different dimensions is only 0.28. Given the low correlation, it is a good idea to use both measures 
in order to check the robustness of results. This is also important for evaluating possible differences 
and the resulting policy implications which may refer to a different set of countries. For example, 
highly fractionalized countries may experience several conflicts at the same time (i.e., the 
Democratic Republic of Congo) even though the share of the country affected by the conflict is not 
large. On the other hand, countries which are not fractionalized may experience extensive conflict 
even though the number of groups is not large (i.e., Cambodia and Egypt).   
 
The UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset on Armed Conflicts and the Political Instability Task Force 
(PITF) represent the two sources that we use to construct our dependent variables. The UCDP/PRIO 
Dyadic Dataset is used in order to construct a count variable, which records the progressive number 
of groups involved in a conflict against the government for each country-year episode over the 
period 1960-2005. On the other hand the PITF provides figures for the geographical extent of the 
conflict
2
. The extent is coded using an ordinal variable between 0 and 4 with 0 denoting episodes 
with no conflict and 4 denoting cases in which the conflict affects more than half of the country’s 
surface area
3
.  
 
 
                                                 
2
  The PITF is a project hosted by the Center for Global Policy at George Mason University and the dataset was 
originally prepared in 1994 by a research team directed by Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff under commission 
from the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence. The dataset is regularly updated and the fact that 
reports on the data have been published in the American Journal of Political Science (e.g. Goldstone et al., 2010) is 
testimony to its quality.   
3
    The PITF coding rule is: 1 if the conflict affects less than 10% of the surface area; 2 if the conflict affects an area 
between 10 and 25 percentper cent of the surface area; 3 if the surface area affected by the conflict is between 25 
and 50 percent; 4 if it is greater than 50 percent.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Extent and Number of Groups 
 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of groups and geographical extent of conflict in our 
dataset. Over the 1960-05 period, the PITF records a total of 868 annual episodes of conflict 
providing an average probability of conflict equal to 10.6 percent. The majority of these conflicts 
have an extent equal to two, which means that in most of the episodes a share of the country 
between 10 and 25 percent of the surface area is affected by the conflict. On the other hand, the 
number of conflicts coded by the UCDP/PRIO is equal to 1010,
4
 providing an average probability 
of conflict equal to 14.1 percent
5
. In almost 7.8 percent of these cases the conflict involves only one 
rebel group (and the government). However, there is a 2.8 percent of episodes in which at least two 
rebel groups challenge the government and a 1.7 percent of episodes in which three or more 
different rebel groups are involved in the conflict. This implies that in almost one third of the 
episodes with conflict there is more than one rebel group involved. 
 
 
Using the distribution in Table 1 we construct new variables which proxy the evolution 
(escalation/de-escalation) of the conflict. The evolution is computed using first differences and it is 
summarized in Table 2. A negative change denotes cases in which the conflict deescalates either in 
terms of geographical extent or in the number of groups involved, while a positive change denotes 
an escalation of the conflict.  
                                                 
4
 The correlation between the incidence in the PITF and  UCDP/PRIO is 0.72 
5
   Differences in the number of conflicts between the two sources are due to the different coding rule applied. The 
UCDP/PRIO Dyadic Dataset on Armed Conflicts defines an armed conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the 
government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year”. The PITF, for its part,  defines a conflict 
as an episode of violent conflict between the government and a politically organized group where each party 
mobilizes 1000 or more people (armed agents, demonstrators, troops) and resulting in “at least 1000 direct conflict-
related deaths over the full course of the armed conflict and at least one year when the annual conflict-related death 
toll exceeds 100 fatalities”. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Evolution of Conflict (not Conditional on Conflict) 
 
With regard to the geographical extent, there are almost 314 country-year episodes in which the 
geographical extent changes with respect to the previous year. Episodes of territorial escalation and 
de-escalation are almost equally distributed and in most cases the conflict escalates/deescalates by 
only one unit
6
. This means for example that over the course the share of the country affected by the 
conflict increases from 10-25 percent (extent = 2) to 25-50 percent of the surface area (extent = 3).  
 
With regard to the evolution of groups involved in the conflict, we find almost 556 cases in which 
the number of groups changes over the course of the conflict. Even in this case, episodes in which 
there is a single group either entering or exiting at a later stage represent the majority. However 
there is almost a 16.4 percent of the cases with conflict in which more than one group either enter or 
exit from the conflict after its outbreak. 
 
Because the number of observations in the tails of the distribution is relatively small (i.e., the 
number of groups entering at a later stage is greater than one) there is a risk that results for these 
episodes of conflict may be driven by only a few countries. To deal with such a problem, we 
summarize positive and negative changes using four different dummy dependent variables. The first 
dummy variable (Δ+ Extent) is equal to one if the extent has spread over the course of the conflict 
independently on the number of changes. The second dummy (Δ- Extent) is coded one if over the 
course of the conflict the extent has shrunk independently on the number of changes. The third 
variable (Δ+ Groups) is positive if any group steps into the conflict. Finally, the last dummy (Δ- 
Groups)   is coded one if any of the rebel groups exits from the conflict. 
                                                 
6
 A one unit change in Table 3 can also represent the onset/outset of conflict, given that the distribution is not 
conditional on conflict. 
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Table 3: Dummy Dependent Variables for the Evolution of Conflict (Conditional on Conflict)  
 
 
 
Table 3 shows the conditional distribution of these four dummy dependent variables. In all 65 
countries for which we have data on the geographical extent there has been at least one episode of 
escalation/de-escalation of conflict over the course (without considering the outbreak and outset). In 
average, out of the 863 episodes of conflict (incidence of conflict) from the PITF there are 157 
cases in which the conflict escalates and a total of 63 episodes in which the conflict de-escalates. 
Therefore in average the extent changes almost after 3.8 years of conflict. With regard to the 
number of groups in conflict again we find that in all 94 countries which have experienced a 
conflict the number of groups changes over the course of the conflict.  Out of a total of 1,002 
episodes of conflict there are 294 cases in which new groups step into the conflict after the outbreak 
and 94 cases in which groups exit from the conflict. Roughly the number of groups in conflict 
changes every 2.5 years of conflict. 
 
In Table 4 we show descriptive statistics for the evolution of conflict given the share of ODA in 
order to provide a general idea of the relationship. The geographical extent of the conflict tends to 
increase (Δ+ Extent) when the share of aid is lower, and to decrease (Δ- Extent) when the share of 
aid is larger, denoting a sort of preventive effect of ODA on the extent of conflict. On the other 
hand a larger share of ODA tends to increase the number of belligerent groups (Δ+ Groups) and to 
reduce the probability of groups exiting  from the conflict (Δ-Groups), which seems consistent with 
a rent-seeking model (i.e., Grossman, 1991). 
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Table 4: Effect of ODA on the Evolution of Conflict 
 
 
4) Empirical Issues  
 
Given that the evolution is conditional on the probability of conflict, the model is best estimated 
using a Heckman-Probit Estimator (Heckman, 1979). This model can be estimated using either a 2-
step estimator or a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). Generally the second estimator is to be 
preferred, because it is considered more efficient. However, the limited number of observations for 
the de-escalation of conflicts (63 out of 863 for the extent and 94 out of 1,002 for the number of 
groups involved) causes a serious risk of underestimating the probability. This downward bias 
occurs because the capacity of logit/probit models to determine a cut-off point is biased in the 
direction of favouring zeros at the expense of ones (King and Zeng, 2001a, 2001b). In order to deal 
with such a problem one can use a two-step estimator in which the second step is estimated using  
either a rare-event Logit/Probit or a Complementary Log Log function (cloglog). Using a rare event 
Logit/Probit or a cloglog link function in the second step would allow us to correct for the fact that 
the link function is not symmetrical (providing consistent estimates); but because this model is not 
estimated using a MLE efficiency is sacrificed.  
 
Given the impossibility of finding a good trade-off between efficiency and consistency we decide to 
use a Maximum Likelihood Heckman-Probit Model in order to gain efficiency in the estimates. Of 
course this means that probability of underestimating effects increase
7
. For this reason the estimated 
effects in the following models are likely to be rather conservative. 
 
                                                 
7
 Given that the MLE Heckman is an efficient estimator then if any coefficients are under-estimated the likelihood of  
not rejecting the null increases. 
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The two equations to be estimated in order to evaluate the effect of ODA on the evolution of 
conflict can be written as follows:  
 
Pr(Conflicti,t = 1)* =  Φ(λ1ODA/GDPi,t-1 + λ2Incidencei,t-1 + λ3Tropical_Areai  + λ4Wi,t-1)           (1)  
 
 
 
Pr(Evolutioni,t =1| Incidence=1) = Φ(β1ODA/GDPi,t-1 + β 2Leveli,t-1 + β3Xi,t-1)               (2)  
 
 
 
Equation 1 represents the selection equation which drives the probability of conflict. The 
probability of conflict depends on the Incidence (t – 1), on the share of ODA (t – 1), and on a set of 
control variables Wi,t-1 which include GDP per capita (t – 1), population (t – 1), ethnic 
fractionalization, share of mountainous terrain, a dummy for oil producers, and government 
consumption (t – 1)8. The variable Tropical_Areai  denotes the share of the population within the 
tropical climate zones which is time invariant and therefore highly unlikely to explain a variable 
which strongly depends on the time-dimension like the evolution of conflict. The ratio for using the 
share of the population within the tropics as an exclusion restriction is related to the empirical 
evidence in the economic and conflict literature. We know that geography affects development (i.e. 
Sachs, 2003) and that development is one of the main causes of conflict (i.e. Collier and Hoeffler, 
2002; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Therefore the share of country within the tropics should explain the 
cross-section variation in the probability of conflict. However because the evolution of conflict 
depends on the time-dimension rather than on the cross-section dimension, we should expect that a 
time invariant variable has a small room to affect the dynamics of conflict which of course is more 
likely to depend on strategic reasons. The inclusion of real GDP per capita as a control variable also 
excludes hypothetical effects of the share of population within the tropics through levels of 
development.   
                                                 
8
 Government consumption is used to control for a possible diversion of aid to current expenditure and/or military 
expenditure.  
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Equation 2 represents the outcome equation where Evolutioni,t is our proxy for the evolution of 
conflict,  Leveli,t-1  is the level of conflict (t -1), Xi,t-1 is the same set of control variables as in the 
selection equation and ODA/GDPi,t-1 is the share of ODA (t – 1).  
 
Data for the level of ODA at current US dollars, GDP at current US dollars, and real GDP per 
capita are collected from the World Bank (WDI). The Penn World Table 7.1 is used to collect data 
on government consumption and population. Fearon and Laitin (2003) is the source for data on 
ethnic fractionalization and mountainous terrains. Data for variables related to democracy are 
collected from the Polity IV dataset, while Sachs (2003) is the source for the share of the population 
within the tropical climate zones. 
 
 
5)  Evolutions of Conflict and Levels of ODA 
 
We start our analysis by looking at the effect of levels of ODA (the share of ODA/GDP) on the 
evolution of conflict. Table 5 reports estimates for the evolution of the geographical extent of 
conflict. In Model 1 we look at factors which may affect the territorial de-escalation of the conflict 
(Δ- Extent) and we find that ODA/GDP (t – 1), the extent of conflict (t – 1), and GDP per capita (t – 
1) are the only variables which have a positive and significant effect on the probability that the 
conflict will de-escalate in terms of geographical extent. Therefore, the larger is the conflict (t - 1) 
and the richer is the country, the higher is the probability that the extent will decrease in the next 
period. At the same time, an increase in the share of ODA/GDP by one percentage increases the 
probability of de-escalation by almost 0.13 percent per year.  
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In Model 2 we show estimates for the escalation of the extent of conflict (Δ+ Extent). The escalation 
also significantly depends on the share of ODA in terms of GDP which decreases the unconditional 
probability (Pr(Δ+ Extent=1))  by almost 1.1 percent per year per a one percentage change, and the 
conditional probability (Pr(Δ+ Extent=1|Conflict=1) by almost 0.12 percent. The extent (t – 1), and 
GDP per capita (t – 1) have now an insignificant effect on the probability of conflict escalating 
(from a territorial point of view), while the probability increases with the number of groups in the 
country. The larger is the number of groups in the country the larger is the probability that the 
conflict will escalate, probably because of the probability of new groups entering.  
 
Selection equations in Table 5 are quite standard. The probability of conflict increases with the 
share of the population within tropical climatic zones, with the population, and with possible 
conflicts in the previous period. GDP per capita and the share of ODA/GDP have both a negative 
and a significant effect on the probability of conflict. 
 
 
Table 5: MLE Heckman Probit – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
 
 
In Table 6 we look at the dynamics of groups in conflict. With regard to the dynamics of groups we 
find that ODA/GDP (t – 1) has a preventive effect in the sense that it decreases the probability of 
new groups entering in the conflict (Model 2). However its effect on the probability of groups 
exiting from the conflict is not significant (Model 1). As with the extent of conflict, the probability 
of new groups entering in the conflict increases with the fractionalization of the country, while the 
probability of groups exiting increases with the number of groups in conflict in the previous year 
16 
and decreases with population (i.e. in larger countries) and with dependence on oil (the oil export 
dummy). 
 
Table 6: MLE Heckman Probit – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
 
 
6) Evolution of Conflict and Change in the Share of ODA 
 
In the previous section we showed a significant effect of levels of ODA on the evolution of conflict. 
However, given the large rate of growth of ODA for countries experiencing a conflict (0.2 vs 0.07 
percent for countries at peace) it is legitimate to wonder if such a larger increase in the inflow of aid 
is functional to the dynamics of conflict. For this reason in this section we try to evaluate what 
happens to the dynamics of conflict when the share of ODA over the course of the conflict changes 
and whether the evolution of the conflict is responsive to the rate of change in the share of ODA.  
 
In Table 7 we focus on the probability of escalation/de-escalation of the extent of conflicts 
conditional on the rate of growth of the share of ODA/GDP. We find that the rate of growth of the 
share of ODA has a decreasing effect on the extent given that the probability that the conflict will 
shrink increases by almost 0.27 percent per a one percentage change in the rate of growth of 
ODA/GDP (Model 1). However, the rate of growth of ODA/GDP does not have any significant 
preventive effect on the probability that the extent of the conflict will spread (Model 2).  
 
Table 7: MLE Heckman – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
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In Table 8 we switch to the dynamics of the number of groups. While the effect of changing the 
share of ODA/GDP over the course of the conflict does not affect the probability of groups exiting 
from the conflict (Model 1), the rate of growth of ODA does have a significant and negative effect 
on the probability of groups entering in the conflict (Model 2). In average the probability that new 
groups will enter in the conflict decreases by almost 0.32 percent for a one percentage change in the 
rate of growth of ODA.  
 
 
Table 8: MLE Heckman – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
 
 
From a policy point of view these results seem to suggest that whether and when to increase the 
share of ODA may depend on the kind of conflict.  In cases of conflicts in ethnic fractionalized 
countries in which there is a risk of new groups entering in the conflict it may be worth to increase 
the share of ODA/GDP soon after the outbreak of the conflict given that it decreases the probability 
that new groups enter in the conflict. Increasing the share of foreign aid also seems recommendable 
in cases of civil war (which normally have a larger extent) given that foreign aid may provide 
support to weak governments which then may affect the probability that the extent of conflict 
decreases and probably the duration of the conflict. On the other hand, increasing the share of ODA 
does not seem particularly effective when the conflict has already spread to neighbouring groups 
(given the insignificant effect on the probability of exiting) and in cases of conflicts which affect a 
small portion of the country given that whether the conflict will spread or not is not affected by the 
rate of growth of ODA. 
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7) The Economic Impact of the Evolution of Conflict 
 
Of course economists are interested in the economic impact of policies. For this reason in this 
section we evaluate the economic impact of the evolution of conflict, in order to understand whether 
there may be an indirect effect of aid on the path of development of countries experiencing a civil 
war. The idea is quite simple. Given that aid has a significant effect on the evolution of conflict then 
it may be the case that aid has an indirect effect on development if  the evolution (rather than the 
incidence) is what matters the most for development. 
 
In order to analyse the economic impact of the evolution of conflict we construct five-year episodes 
of growth. Five-year episodes of growth are quite common in the literature on conflict (Chen et al., 
2008; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; and Elbadawi et al., 2008) even though it may be argued that 
economic growth needs to be evaluated over a long-term horizon. The reason why we decide to 
look at a shorter period is because it would be difficult to proxy the evolution of conflict over a 
longer time-horizon. Looking at a longer time-horizon might cause the loss of useful information 
related to the annual variation in the evolution. Using five-year episodes, however, represents a fair 
compromise between the need to give the necessary variation to the evolution of conflict and the 
need to evaluate a sort of intermediate effect in terms of economic growth.  
 
Data on real GDP per capita growth, real GDP per capita, and ODA/GDP are collected from the 
WDI. We use the Penn World Table 7.1 to collect data on government consumption, trade/GDP, 
investment/GDP, and population growth. Data about the evolution of conflict are the same as those 
used in previous sections. More specifically, we use four dummy variables to proxy whether in the 
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five years there has been an escalation or a de-escalation of the conflict, either in terms of 
geographical extent or in terms of the number of groups involved.    
 
Table 9 shows growth-estimates using a 2-step GMM estimator in order to deal with a possible 
endogeneity of the incidence and evolution of conflict. In Model 1 we look at a possible effect of 
changing the number of groups in the conflict on the rate of growth of real GDP per capita. In order 
to do this, we enter in the model dummies for whether new groups have entered or exited from the 
conflict, together with a dummy for the incidence of conflict. While the incidence of conflict is not 
significant, the change in the number of groups in conflict does have a marked effect on economic 
growth. The rate of growth of GDP decreases by almost 3.7 percentage if any new group enters the 
conflict over the five-year period and this effect is significant at a 1 percent level. At the same time, 
the rate of growth increases by almost 2.8 percentage if any of the rebel groups exit (Model 1).  
  
In Model 2 we look at the potential growth effect of the escalation/de-escalation of conflict in terms 
of geographical extent.  As with Model 1, the incidence of conflict is not significant but the proxy 
for the escalation of conflict has a significant and negative effect on economic growth. If the 
conflict escalates in terms of geographical extent, then the rate of growth of output is reduced by an 
average 4.7 percent over the five-year period.  
 
Table 9: Economic Impact of the Evolution 
 
Therefore in terms of development it is not important whether there is a conflict or not. What 
matters is how the conflict changes over its course. In addition, given that ODA is one of the few 
variables that affect the evolution of conflict, what is implied is that there is a sort of indirect effect 
of ODA on economic growth in conflict economies. 
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8) Conclusions  
 
Whether aid has a positive or negative effect on the probability of conflict and the economic 
impact of aid in conflict economies are two of the most important issues faced by  international 
donors when they come to decide whether to allocate aid to countries experiencing conflict. Using 
proxies for the evolution of conflict, we show that aid has a significant effect on the probability that 
the conflict will either escalate or deescalate and that by affecting the evolution of conflict aid also 
affects the incidence of conflict. In addition, we find that for economic growth the evolution of 
conflict is what matters. Therefore, by affecting the evolution of conflict aid also has a significant 
and indirect effect on economic growth.  
 
We find, too, that policy variables under the control of the government are hardly significant 
in explaining the evolution of conflict, which is likely to be the result of the lack of room for 
national policy makers to manoeuvre. For this reason the support of the international community is 
essential in countries experiencing a conflict, given that international donors are the only ones who 
can provide enough variation in national budgets. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Extent and Number of Groups 
PITF UCDP/PRIO 
Extent Freq. Percent Groups Freq. Percent 
   
  
  
0 7,322 89.40 0 7,022 87.69 
Extent < 10% 249 3.04 1 632 7.89 
10%< Extent < 25% 288 3.52 2 222 2.77 
25%< Extent < 50% 164 2.00 3 80 1.00 
Extent > 50% 167 2.04 4 17 0.21 
   
5 11 0.14 
   
6 7 0.09 
   
7 11 0.14 
      8 6 0.07 
   
  
  Total 8,190 100.00 Total 8,008 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Evolution of Conflict (not Conditional on Conflict) 
 
PITF UCDP/PRIO 
Territorial Evolution 
Freq. Percent 
Groups Evolution  
Freq. Percent 
  
  
  
   
-4 16 0.20 -4 2 0.02 
-3 26 0.32 -3 11 0.14 
-2 45 0.56 -2 31 0.39 
-1 70 0.87 -1 218 2.72 
0 7,694 96.08 0 7,452 93.06 
1 73 0.91 1 247 3.08 
2 49 0.61 2 37 0.46 
3 20 0.25 3 9 0.11 
4 15 0.19 5 1 0.01 
  
  
   
Total 8,008 100.00 Total 6,075 100 
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Table 3: Dummy Dependent Variables for the Evolution of Conflict (Conditional on Conflict)  
 
Territorial Escalation Groups Entering 
Δ+ Extent Freq. Percent Cum. Δ+ Groups Freq. Percent Cum. 
   
  
    0 706 81.81 81.81 0 708 70.66 70.66 
1 157 18.19 100.00 1 294 29.34 100.00 
        
Total 863 100.00  Total 1,002 100.00  
   
  
    Territorial De-escalation Groups Exiting 
Δ- Extent Freq. Percent Cum. Δ+ Groups Freq. Percent Cum. 
    
    0 800 92.70 92.70 0 908 90.62 90.62 
1 63 7.30 100.00 1 94 9.38 100.00 
        
Total 863 100.00  Total 1,002 100.00  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Effect of ODA on the Evolution of Conflict 
Territorial Escalation Groups Entering 
Δ+ Extent ODA/GDP Std. Dev. Freq. Δ+ Groups ODA/GDP Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
     
0 0.056 0.090 680 0 0.053 0.092 671 
1 0.053 0.088 139 1 0.065 0.101 278 
    
     
Total 0.055 0.089 819 Total 0.056 0.0949 949 
    
    
Territorial De-escalation Groups Exiting 
Δ- Extent ODA/GDP Std. Dev. Freq. Δ- Groups ODA/GDP Std. Dev. Freq. 
    
     
0 0.054 0.084 761 0 0.057 0.097 859 
1 0.072 0.143 58 1 0.050 0.066 90 
         
Total 0.055 0.089 819 Total 0.056 0.094 949 
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Table 5: MLE Heckman Probit – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
   The Evolution of the Extent of Conflict 
  Outcome Equation Selection Equation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variables Δ- Extent Δ+ Extent Incidence Incidence 
  
  
  
Log Population (t -1) 0.0828 -0.0973 0.0819** 0.0828** 
 
(1.16) (-1.52) (2.35) (2.39) 
Log real GDP per cap. (t - 1) 0.157*** -0.0890 -0.178*** -0.177*** 
 
(2.67) (-1.04) (-4.33) (-4.23) 
Oil producers Dummy -0.0160 -0.275 0.143 0.158 
 
(-0.10) (-1.40) (1.36) (1.52) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.142 0.372 -0.133 -0.161 
 
(0.55) (1.09) (-0.72) (-0.87) 
ODA/GDP (t - 1) 1.391** -4.849** -1.410*** -1.410*** 
 
(2.00) (-2.35) (-2.74) (-2.68) 
Government Consumption (t - 1) 0.0512 -0.136 0.0538 0.0457 
 
(0.50) (-1.11) (0.72) (0.62) 
Extent of Conflict (t - 1) 0.375*** -0.215** 
  
 
(3.22) (-2.49) 
  
Incidence (t - 1)   3.214*** 3.215*** 
 
    (36.95) (37.00) 
Tropical Area   0.228** 0.232** 
  
  (2.15) (2.02) 
Constant -4.542*** 1.652 -2.449*** -2.331*** 
 
(-2.74) (1.08) (-3.14) (-3.17) 
  
  
  
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0) 0.192 0.000*** 
  
Observations 644 644 4,575 4,575 
z-statistics in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: MLE Heckman Probit – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
   The Dynamics of Groups 
  Outcome Equation Selection Equation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variables Δ- Groups Δ+ Groups Incidence Incidence 
  
  
  
Log Population (t -1) -0.176*** 0.0559 0.147*** 0.129*** 
 
(-3.89) (1.01) (5.55) (4.78) 
Log real GDP per cap. (t - 1) 0.0408 -0.0964 -0.106*** -0.105*** 
 
(0.80) (-1.58) (-3.51) (-3.44) 
Oil producers Dummy -0.286** 0.0508 0.220*** 0.216*** 
 
(-2.46) (0.29) (2.72) (2.69) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.198 0.528** 0.278* 0.233 
 
(-0.91) (2.00) (1.84) (1.61) 
ODA/GDP (t - 1) -0.289 -1.379*** -0.547 -0.654 
 
(-0.37) (-2.69) (-1.24) (-1.53) 
Government Consumption (t - 1) -0.0294 0.0944 0.0995* 0.117** 
 
(-0.40) (0.86) (1.72) (2.00) 
Nr. Groups in Conflict (t - 1) 0.415*** 0.0347 
  
 
(8.29) (0.67) 
  
Incidence (t - 1)   2.509*** 2.547*** 
 
    (37.38) (38.14) 
Tropical Area   0.112 0.169** 
  
  (1.41) (1.98) 
Constant 1.680 -2.161* -3.934*** -3.698*** 
 
(1.62) (-1.81) (-6.69) (-6.11) 
  
  
  
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  
Observations 766 766 4,575 4,575 
z-statistics in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: MLE Heckman – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
   The Evolution of the Extent of Conflict 
  Outcome Equation Selection Equation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variables Δ- Extent Δ+ Extent Incidence Incidence 
  
  
  
Log Population (t -1) 0.0735 -0.0408 0.0980*** 0.0991*** 
 
(1.00) (-0.66) (2.86) (2.92) 
Log real GDP per cap. (t - 1) 0.137** 0.0331 -0.149*** -0.146*** 
 
(2.38) (0.43) (-3.85) (-3.77) 
Oil producers Dummy -0.0680 -0.206 0.208** 0.223** 
 
(-0.40) (-1.05) (1.96) (2.14) 
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.175 0.316 -0.187 -0.218 
 
(0.65) (0.93) (-0.99) (-1.16) 
∆.ODA/GDP (t - 1) 3.024** -0.915 -2.261*** -2.201*** 
 
(2.44) (-0.45) (-3.33) (-3.25) 
Government Consumption (t - 1) 0.0748 -0.171 0.0278 0.0192 
 
(0.72) (-1.38) (0.37) (0.26) 
Extent of Conflict (t - 1) 0.383*** -0.238*** 
  
 
(3.12) (-2.73) 
  
Incidence (t - 1)   3.209*** 3.209*** 
 
    (36.63) (36.70) 
Tropical Area   0.262** 0.272** 
  
  (2.32) (2.35) 
Constant -4.261** -0.132 -2.948*** -2.962*** 
 
(-2.53) (-0.09) (-3.94) (-3.98) 
  
  
  
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0) 0.239 0.000*** 
  
Observations 644 644 4,575 4,575 
z-statistics in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: MLE Heckman – Evolution and Incidence of Conflict 
   The Dynamics of Groups 
  Outcome Equation Selection Equation 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 Dependent Variables Δ- Groups Δ+ Groups Incidence Incidence 
  
  
  
Log Population (t -1) -0.153*** 0.0684 0.148*** 0.130*** 
 
(-3.97) (1.23) (5.70) (4.87) 
Log real GDP per cap. (t - 1) 0.0583 -0.0709 -0.0975*** -0.0943*** 
 
(1.36) (-1.14) (-3.46) (-3.28) 
Oil producers Dummy -0.291** 0.126 0.245*** 0.242*** 
 
(-2.50) (0.68) (3.04) (2.96) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.169 0.522 0.236 0.206 
 
(-0.87) (1.62) (1.58) (1.34) 
∆.ODA/GDP (t - 1) 1.294 -2.627*** -1.816*** -1.931*** 
 
(0.99) (-3.63) (-2.74) (-3.05) 
Government Consumption (t - 1) -0.0112 0.0671 0.0838 0.102* 
 
(-0.15) (0.61) (1.45) (1.73) 
Nr. Groups in Conflict (t - 1) 0.408*** 0.0404 
  
 
(8.55) (0.72) 
  
Incidence (t - 1)   2.515*** 2.555*** 
 
    (36.99) (37.24) 
Tropical Area   0.143* 0.187** 
  
  (1.85) (2.09) 
Constant 1.102 -2.596** -4.030*** -3.815*** 
 
(1.29) (-2.15) (-7.10) (-6.50) 
  
  
  
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  
Observations 766 766 4,575 4,575 
z-statistics in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Economic Impact of the Evolution 
Dependent Variable: 5-year Average real per capita GDP growth 
 Estimation Method: 2-step GMM Model  1 Model 2 
   Log Real GDP per Capita, Lagged -1.545** -1.368** 
 
(-2.56) (-2.07) 
Log (1 + Investment/GDP) 2.823*** 2.657*** 
 
(2.94) (2.59) 
Incidence -0.438 1.106 
 
(-0.54) (1.36) 
Δ+ Number of Groups -3.674*** 
 
 
(-2.92) 
 Δ- Number of Groups 2.831*** 
 
 
(2.99) 
 Δ+ Extent 
 
-4.734*** 
  
(-3.27) 
Δ- Extent 
 
-0.317 
  
(-0.42) 
Constant  16.53* 12.10 
 
(1.92) (1.41) 
   AR (1) Test  (p-values) 0.012 0.009 
AR (2) Test  (p-values) 0.791 0.691 
Hansen J-Statistics (p-values) 0.868 0.742 
Observations 882 882 
Number of Countries 142 142 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses (Windmeijer; 2005): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
GMM Instruments: Lag (1/2) Xt or Lag (2/3) Xt depending whether variables are endogenous or pre-determined. 
IV Instruments: Time dummies 
Other Controls (not reported) include: Population Growth, Government Consumption (in GDP), Trade (in GDP), 
ODA (in GDP), Ethnic Fractionalization and Dummies for Asia, Africa and Aid Recipient. 
 
 
